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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
SALT LAKE CITY CO,RPORA TION WAS WITH-
OUT P·OWER TO PASS CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 32 OF 
THE REVISED O·RDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
1955. 
POINT 2 
CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 3 2 OF THE REVISED 
ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 1955, VIOLATES 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF 
SE~CTION 7, ARTICLE I, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. Salt Lake City Corporation was with-
out power to pass Chapter 2 of Title 32 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1955. 
Appellants cite Sec. 10-8-40 and Sec. 10-8-84, 
UCA 1953, for legislative grant of power to Salt Lake 
City to pass the subject ordinance. That the latter 
section gives no such power is no longer debatable 
since this precise question, involving these two sections, 
has already been determined by this Court. In Ameri-
can Fork City, v. Robinson, 77 Utah, 168, 292 P. 
249, this Court said '~The last statute quoted (Comp. 
Laws Utah 1917. Sec. 570x87. now Sec. 10-8-84 
UCA 19 53) is merely in aid of the express powers 
elsewhere granted.'' Any other construction of this 
section would be an absurdity. This section ( 10-8-
84) provides that cities "may pass all ordinances and 
rules. and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, 
necessary for carrying in to effect or discharging all 
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3 
powers and duties conferred by this chapter ... , 
and to provide for the general welfare of the inhab-
itants and to enforce such ordinances by fines and 
penalties. Since, presumably no ordinance is passed 
which is not for the general welfare of the inhabitants, 
to hold that the section gives to cities the power 
claimed for it by appellants would be to say that the 
Legislature said in effect to the cities ~'You may do 
all of the things enumerated in the first 83 sections of 
this chapter, and in addition to these, you may also 
do anything else., 
Power to pass this ordinance must therefore be 
found, if at all, in Sec. 10-8-40 UCA 1953. This 
section authorizes cities to "license, tax, regulate and 
suppress billiard, pool, bagatelle," etc. Possibly the 
most significant issue to the determination of this 
case is the meaning of the term "suppress" as used in 
this statute. Appellants cite three cases to show that 
suppress means substantially the same thing as prohibit, 
but the cases are by no means consistent. The court 
said in Johnson v. Town of Philadelphia~ 47 So. 526, 
527, 94 Miss. 34, 19 LRA, NS 637, 19 Ann. Cas. 
103, "A statute, authorizing a municipal corporation 
to ~suppress' skating rinks, gives no power to prohibit 
them." In a recent decision ( 19 50) the court said 
that where a statute gave the city power to license, 
tax, regulate or suppress billiard tables (identical word-
ing to that in our statute), use of the word "suppress" 
conferred upon the city the power, as a police regula-
tion, to suppress unlicensed billiard tables doing busi-
ness without a license, but not the power to prohibit 
them. City of Meadville v. Caselman~ 227 SW 2d 77, 
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80, 240 Mo. App. 1220. Since the term '~suppress" 
is not entirely free from ambiguity, it is necessary to 
determine what meaning was intended by the Legisla-
ture in enacting Sec. 10-8-40 UCA 1953. 
It is not necessary to look beyond the statute 
itself to find exactly what was intended, although 
this Court has already determined that intent, as 
pointed out later in this brief. Appellants quote only 
a part of Sec. 10-8-40. The entire section reads as 
follows: 
'~10-8-40. Resorts and amusements. -
They may license, tax, regulate and suppress 
billiard, pool, bagatelle, pigeonhole or any other 
tables or implements kept or used for similar 
purpose; also pin alleys or tables, or ball alleys; 
may also license, tax, regulate, prohibit or sup-
press dancing halls, dancing resorts, dancing 
pavilions, and all places or resorts to which 
persons of opposite sexes may resort for the 
purpose of dancing or indulging in any other 
social amusements." 
As pointed out by the decision of the lower court, 
''It will be noted by an examination of the above-re-
ferred to statute that in the first portion of the statute 
the city may regulate and suppress certain items, one 
of which is the subject of this action. In the other 
portion of the statute the city has the power to pro-
hibit and suppress. Apparently the Legislature, in 
passing this statute, made a distinction between pro-
hibiting and suppressing." 
Nor does counsel for appellants seriously contend 
that the terms are synonymous in spite of his state-
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5 
ment to that effect. (Note on page 22 of appellants 
brief "In any event the ordinance of Salt Lake City 
amounts only to a suppression of the machines as the 
case of Ex Parte Lawrence, supra, makes abundantly 
clear. The effect is not, as stated by the lower court, 
an absolute prohibition", and similar statements else-
where in appellants brief. ) 
It is most interesting to note that counsel for a p-
pellants (page 21 of appellants brief) cites Sec. 17-5-27 
UCA 1953 purporting to give counties the power to 
suppress and prohibit, and by implication urging that 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah should find 
that the comparable section pertaining to cities means 
something different from what it says because it is 
'.'inconceivable" that the Legislature intended to grant 
broader power to counties than to cities. This grasp-
ing for straws hardly seems to require rebuttal. 
It seems perfectly clear from the foregoing, that 
Sec. 10-8-40 UCA 1953, gives to cities, in the first 
part of the statute, the power to regulate and sup-
press, but not to prohibit the activities which are the 
subject of this action. It is therefore necessary to de-
termine the effect of the subject ordinance. 
It should be observed that the preamble and the 
title of the first section of the subject ordinance refer 
to Hprohibition of pin ball machines". It is not diffi-
cult to determine that that is precisely what was in-
tended-an absolute prohibition of these devices. 
A pin-ball machine is a device with which the 
owner offers to the public, for a fee, the right to play 
and operate such device for such amusement as he may 
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derive therefrom. This ordinance prohibits their use 
in the only places where their use is possible. It could 
be argued with equal cogency that an ordinance pro-
hibiting the use of motor vehicles on city streets was 
suppressive only, because they could still be used in 
one's home or back yard-or that a statute prohibiting 
motion picture theatres from admitting the public 
for an admission fee was suppressive only, because 
the owner could still invite his friends to the theatre 
gratuitously. In Johnson v. Town of Philadelphia, 
supra, the ordinance in question required skating rinks 
to be closed after 6 P.M., when the statute empowered 
the city to regulate and suppress skating rinks. The 
court found this to amount to a prohibition of skating 
rinks. The court there said ''Under the pretense of 
regulating a business, the business attempted to be 
regulated cannot be destroyed. This was not the in-
tention of the Legislature. If the Legislature had in-
tended that amusements of this character could be 
prohibite·d by a municipality, they would have said 
so in unequivocal terms." 
It is important to observe that great reliance is 
placed by appellants on the case of Ex Parte Lawrence, 
55 Cal. App. 2d 491, 131 P 2d 27, construing a 
city ordinance similar to that of appellants. In the 
Lawrence case the court said ''In the case now before 
us, regulation, not prohibition, is decreed by the or-
dinance. The games are proscribed only in places of 
business or in any other 'place of public resort', and 
exception is made of the amusement zones described in 
another Long Beach ordinance. In other words, 'pin 
hair and other games denominated in the ordinance 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
may be maintained at private house or in certain de-
lineated amusement zones., The clear and unequivocal 
implication is, that if it were not for the amusement 
zones in Long Beach, where pin ball machines could 
be operated, that the ordinance would have amounted 
to a prohibition, and the court would have struck 
down as ultra vires an ordinance such as that passed 
by appellants, and in this regard, it is clear that the 
Lawrence case constitutes strong support for respond-
ents position. 
The Utah case of American Fork City v. Robin-
son, supra, is consistent with the foregoing discussion 
and with the authorities cited distinguishing suppres-
sion from prohibition of amusement devices. A care-
ful reading of this case makes it obvious that appellants 
have wholly misconstrued the holding of this case, 
as shown by a confusing attempt to find something 
in the case that is simply not there. The facts were 
simple. One ordinance prohibited the use of billiard 
and pool tables in public places, another prohibited 
them in club rooms. The latter was being tested, the 
former was not before the Court. The Supreme Court 
simply held that the ordinance went too far in pro-
hibiting their use, when the enabling act authorized 
only suppression. The indisputable implication is that 
had the other ordinance, prohibiting their use in public 
places, been before the court, it would have struck 
down that ordinance also. Nowhere does the court 
say, or imply, that the ordinance was not broad 
enough, as appellants contend. On the contrary, the 
court says, HThe first statute referred to (now Sec-
tion 10-8-40 UCA 1953) plainly confers power with 
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reference to billiard and pool tables; and does not ex-
tend beyond the regulation or suppression of keeping 
them" and it seems clear that the court said in effect 
that prohibiting the playing at billiards or pool does 
extend beyond the regulation or suppression of keep-
ing them, that it had already gone too far and had in 
fact prohibited rather than suppressed them. 
Appellants attempt to find a distinction in the 
American Fork City case between "use" or "playing 
at billiards" and the ~~keeping of billiard tables". No 
such distinction exists. The ordinance before the court 
in that case read in part: ~~Sec. 3. Billiards and Pool. 
It shall be unlawful for any person to keep for use 
in any Club Room in this city any billiard or pool 
table . . . ", so that ordinance did specifically at-
tempt to prohibit the keeping of billiard tables, and 
not, as has been said, the playing at billiards. When 
that court said "The part of the ordinance in question 
does not deal with the subject of keeping billiard or 
pool tables ... " it merely said in effect that the ordin-
ance attempted to prohibit billiard and pool. rather 
than to ·regulate and suppress the keeping of them. 
While the decision in the American Fork City 
case is clear and unambiguous, it should be noted that 
the significant facts and argument before the court in 
that case, as found in the abstract and briefs of ap-
pellants and respondents in that case, concerning power 
of the city to pass the ordinance were practically identi-
cal to the facts and arguments presented in this case. 
Since the pertinent statutes remain unchanged, and 
since the legal issues are indistinguishable, only by a 
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complete repudiation and reversal of its former unan-
imous decision could this Court uphold the validity 
of the appellants ordinance. 
In NasPell v. Ogden City, 249 P. 2d 507, this 
Court said: 
''We are committed to the principle that 
cities have none of the elements of sovereignty, 
that 'any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt 
concerning the existence of the power is resolved 
by the courts against the corporation (city) 
and the power denied'. Utah Rapid Transit 
Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 58 P 2d 1, 
and 1 Dillion, Municipal Corp., 5th ed., p 448, 
Sec. 237; Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 
504, 124 P 2d 537 ... So firm have we stood 
in construing express grants of power to cities 
as to conclude that cities have no implied power 
to prevent billiard playing, where the Legisla-
ture granted express power to 'license, tax, regu-
late and suppress billiard tables ... ' American 
Fork City v. Robinson, supra ... The policy 
of our law thus is settled. The rule promotes 
a wholesome, uniform orderliness among the 
municipalities of the state. Its wisdom is not 
open to question at this date, and we ought not 
depart from it lightly." 
Attention is again called to the dissent in the 
Nasfell case, cited by appellants, wherein Justice 
Crockett said "I expressly agree with Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Wolfe's statement, 'some of our holdings we have 
too narrow 1 y construed the gran ted powers' '', citing 
the American Fork City case and others. Without 
questioning the wisdom of the court in thus ''narrow-
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ly construing the granted powers", it is significant to 
note that the American Fork City case was decided on 
October 11, 19 3 0 ~ in a unanimous decision. Since 
that time the Utah Legislature has been in general 
session fourteen times~ and has not seen fit to change 
in any way, the statute so construed by this Court. 
Certainly if there remained any doubt about the ex-
tent of the grant of the power in this statute, that 
doubt has been resolved by the tacit approval of four-
teen State Legislatures of the narrow construction of 
the subject statute. It seems also apparent from the 
several opinions in the Nasfell case that although one 
may disagree with the wisdom of these decisions, very 
strictly construing grants of power to cities, that it is 
recognized that such is the law of this State, and that 
the great importance of the doctrine of stare decisis 
far outweighs any considerations that would lead to 
reversing the decisions of this court of so long a 
standing. 
Point 2. Chapter 2 of Title 32 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City 19 55, violates the con-
stitutional due process clause of Section 7, Article I, 
Constitution of Utah. 
Certain facts we believe to be of common knowl-
edge, without reference to statutory or municipal law, 
judicial authority, or expert testimony. Pin-ball 
machines have been used for many years to provide 
such amusement as may be obtained threfrom. Many of 
them are readily adaptable and convertible into gambl-
ing devicest and no amount of whitewash could conceal 
the fact that they have been so adapted and converted 
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on numerous occasions, in violation of state and muni-
cipal gambling laws, although, that this is their sole 
purpose we vehemently deny. It was clearly the pur-
pose and intent of defendants in passing the subject 
ordinance to find a short cut in the enforcement of the 
existing criminal gambling laws by absolutely forbid-
ding their use, and no one will be deceived or misled by 
legal rationalizing of appellants, e.g., that the ordin-
ance only regulates and suppresses their use. The same 
motives would be equally valid in prohibiting the 
multitude of other recreational, amusement, athletic 
events, and other sports and activities, which likewise 
can be, and frequently are, made the basis of violations 
of the gambling laws of this State. This is an attempt 
at Hpreventive criminal legislation" which is repugnant 
to all our concepts of fair play. 
That reasonable regulation of the operation of 
pin-ball machines is proper and warranted is not denied, 
but the subject ordinance if enforced, would, as it was 
intended to do, put out of business all pin-ball machine 
operators, including the prohibition of many innoc-
uous machines, designed for amusement only, and 
operated for amusement only. 
The waning efficacy of constitutional due 
process, particularly in the U.S. Constitution, and to 
a much lesser degree in the various state constitutions, 
and the corresponding increase in the police power, 
has to a large extent been necessitated by the increasing 
complexity of our society. Since the invalidation of 
the National Industrial Recovery Act, no important 
federal legislation has been held unconstititional on 
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any grounds. Some states have, by judicial decisions, 
almost completely abrogated the due process and other 
constitutional provisions and given carte blanche 
authority to the lawmakers, through their police pow-
er, to legislate what in their opinions will best serve 
the so-called general welfare. But it will be a sad day 
in the history of political democracy when substantive 
due process is dead and the "tyranny of the majority" 
becomes absolute. 
Although most of the cases cited by appellants 
on the question of constitutional due process are dis-
tinguishable and not in point here, such as the Lawrence 
case, where due process and police power were con-
sidered in the light of an ordinance which only regulat-
ed and suppressed the operation of pin-ball machines, 
a few of the States highest courts have determined the 
due process question as it relates to pin-ball machines, 
and it is not denie·d that at least two of these 
have decided that an ordinance prohibiting them did 
not violate the constitutional provisions of those 
States. The Supreme Court of this State has never 
gone so far in destroying the rights of minorities for 
what is believed by the legislators to be in the best 
interests of the general welfare. 
Since this Court has already decided, in the Amer-
ican Fork City case, that a municipality has no power 
to prohibit the activities enumerated in the first part 
of Sec. 10-8-40 UCA 1953, it should be unnecessary 
to determine the question of constitutional due process 
at this time. However, when the issue is presented to 
this Court in a proper case, where minority interests 
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do not have available the facilities of any other forum, 
serious consideration must be given to the extent to 
which the police power may be used to reduce to im-
potence the due process clause of our constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has already determined that cities do 
not have the power to prohibit pin-ball machines, but 
only to regulate and suppress them. When, in the exer-
cise of such power, they exceed the bounds of regula-
tion and suppression, as appellants have done in this 
case, it is the duty of the courts to strike down such 
ordinance as ultra vires as the lower court has done, and 
that decision should be affirmed. 
R. J. RIMENSBERGER 
Attorney for Respondents 
404 Dooly Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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